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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
MERLENE LODDER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Case No.
7809

WESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY and RICHARD WHITE,
Defendants and Appellants.

Petition For Rehearing
And Brief In Support Thereof

PETITION FOR REHEARING
The Western Pacific Railroad Company and Richard
White, appellants herein, respectively petition this Honorable Court for a rehearing and reargument in the above
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entitled case. The petition is based upon the following
grounds:
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINT IV AS ARGUED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF AND IN FAILING TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT THEREON.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE
EVIDENCE AND SPECIAL VERDICT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD
THAT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
PLAINTIFF'S ACCIDENT AND INJURIES
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRIVER.

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINTS V AND VI AS ARGUED IN
APPELLANTS' BRIEF AND IN FAILING TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT THEREON.

,"~
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-\

WHEREFORE, the Appellants, petitioners herein, pray
that the judgment and opinion of the court be reexamined
and a reargument permitted of the entitled case.
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith.

,...

-·

,_

l.:.·

...:...

VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY

Grant H. Bagley,
Leonard J. Lewis,

Attorneys for Petitioners.
GRANT H. BAGLEY, hereby certifies that he is one
of the attorneys for Appellants, petitioners herein, and
that in his opinion there is good cause to believe that the
opinion is erroneous on the grounds set forth in the following brief, and that the case ought to be reexamined and reargued as prayed for in said petition.
DATED this,_ _ _ _.day of August, 1953.
Grant H. Bagley

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

J
)

Ordinarily appellants would not ask the court to reconsider a decision concurred in by all the members of the

court. However, due to the importance of the questions involved and an abiding conviction that the judgment of the
trial court should not be affirmed, appellants urge the
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court to consider fully the questions and arguments which
they make at this time.

4

The decision of the court would seem to depart from
the law in this field as established by the court in the
course of its consideration of railroad grade crossing accidents. Furthermore, the appellants are disturbed that
the court has not seen fit to recognize and discuss in its
opinion several of the i~portant questions involved and
that it has not condemned certain of the erroneous practices and rulings in the trial of the case.
The brief which follows is submitted, not to rehash
previous arguments, but to insure that no material issue
has escaped the consideration of the court. This is a purpose, we are sure, in which the court concurs.

POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINT IV AS ARGUED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF AND IN FAILING TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
.COURT THEREON.
The appellants vigorously contended in their brief
and upon oral argument to the court that the trial court
erred in refusing to submit the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence, and in refusing to instruct the jury on
that issue as requested by defendants. (Appellants' Brief,
pages 6, 7, 52.) In its opinion this court makes no mention of that contention. At page 2 of the opinion, t:he court
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5
expressly excludes that issue as one of appellants' contentions on this appeal. Appellants feel particularly justified
therefor in asking the court at this time to give that issue
the consideration which it merits.
Throughout the course of this action, it was one of
defendants' contentions that plaintiff was herself guilty of
negligence proximately causing her accident and injury.
This defense was alleged in defendants' answers ( R. 4, 6) .
In their answer to plaintiff's interrogatories, defendants set
forth the several specific respects in which it was claimed
that plaintiff was negligent (R. 21). In their Requested
Instruction No. 9, the defendants set forth the law applicable to the facts on this defense (R. 339). A reading of
that requested instruction will show that defendants' contention was not restricted to the claim that plaintiff's negligence consisted merely of failure to maintain a lookout for
the locomotive in question. It is extremely significant that
the trial judge gave his tacit approval to the substance
of said instruction by subscribing his name thereto and the
words "given in substance." It is also significant that
plaintiff herself recognized that the law and the evidence
required the submission of the issue of her negligence to
the jury under her Requested Instruction No. 1 (R. 341).
Plaintiff asked that the whole question of her negligence be
determined by the jury, not just the question of "lookout."
Despite the defendants' pleadings and the requested instructions and the approval of said instructions by the trial
court and plaintiff's counsel, the said defense was not submitted to the jury and no determination thereof was made
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by the jury. The only inquiry made to the jury upon that
issue was contained in Special Interrogatory No. 16:
"Question No. 16: Do you find by a preponderanc of the evidence that plaintiff herself negligently
failed to keep a lookout for the approach of the locomotive with which the car in which she was riding
collided?"
A critical consideration of the said interrogatory will
readily reveal that it was insufficient. It utterly fails to
·inquire whether plaintiff was negligent in failing to listen
for or hear the bell on the locomotive. The importance of ·
this inquiry is manifest when one considers that the jury
found that the bell was ringing continuously as the locomotive approached the intersection. Said interrogatory does
not even fully inquire as to plaintiff's duty to maintain a
lookout; it is restricted to whether plaintiff maintained a
lookout for the locomotive. It fails to inquire whether plaintiff was negligent in failing to maintain a lookout for the
crossing watchman or a signal from him, or for the presence
of other conditions or movements constituting forewarning
of danger. Finally, the interrogatory utterly fails to inquire whether plaintiff was negligent in failing to warn
or caution the driver concerning his speed or the conditions
of the road or crossing.
Under the law and the pleadings and the evidence, defendants were entitled to have the jury determine the whole
issue of plaintiff's negligence, not just the question whether
the plaintiff was negligent in failing to maintain a lookout
for the locomotive. This court has frequently held that the
duty of an automobile passenger is to exercise that degree
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of care which is customarily expected of a reasonable and
prudent passenger under the circumstances.

Hudson v. U. P. R. R. Co., . . . Utah ... , 233
P. 2d 357;
Montague v. S. L. & U. R. R. Co., ... Utah
. , 17 4, Pac. 871 ;
Cowan v. S. L. & U. R. R. Co., . . . Utah
184 Pac. 599.

.,

The duty of a passenger obviously includes more than
simply maintaining a lookout for a specific approaching
vehicle or object. It includes looking and listening and
warning, and all other acts of a reasonable and prudent
passenger under the circumstances. Surely neither the trial
court nor this court could say that as a matter of law
reasonable minds could not find that plaintiff was negligent in failing to listen for or hear the bell on the locomotive, or in failing to observe other warnings or signs of
danger at the intersection, or in failing to caution or warn
the driver of his speed or conditions of the road or the crossing. These were questions which reasonable minds could
differ upon, and questions, therefore, which should have
been submitted to and determined by the jury. By her Requested Instruction No. 1 the plaintiff herself conceded
this.
Appellants are unable to understand the statement
made by the court in paragraph 1, page 2, of its opinion
that the jury exonerated plaintiff and the driver of the
automobile from any and all negligence, when in fact the
jury was given no opportunity to ever pass upon the ques-
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tion of plaintiff's negligence except in answer to the inquiry contained in Interrogatory No. 16. It is clear, as
argued in appellants' brief, page 45, that no findings in
support of the judgment can be implied. Certainly no
finding as to plaintiff's negligence could be inferred from
the finding regarding the driver's negligence. Plaintiff
could and might well. have been found guilty of negligence
independent from any acts or omissions on the part of the
driver. Only by the loosest and most uncritical type of
thinking could a determination of the issue of plaintiff's
negligence be sustained by reference to findings on the
negligence of the driver. Moreover, the interrogatories did
not fully submit the issue of the driver's negligence. No inquiry was made in them whether the driver was negligent
in failing to listen for and hear the locomotive bell.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE
EVIDENCE AND SPECIAL VERDICT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT.
The judgment must be sustained, if at all, on the basis
of the interrogatories and the jury's answers thereto and
the evidence. A consideration of the interrogatories relating to the issue of defendants' negligence and the evidence
will show that the judgment cannot be sustained. The said
interrogatories will be discussed in the order in which they
were submitted.

Interrogatory No.1: The jury answered this interrogatory in favor of defendants, and, therefore, no judgment
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could be predicated upon the claim of negligence claimed
in it.

:~

-: ......

Interrogatory No. 3: The only inquiry made in this
interrogatory and the only determination made by the jury
thereon was whether the locomotive whistle was sounded
just prior to the entrance of the locomotive into the intersection. Except for the negative testimony of plaintiff and
her husband who said they did not hear the whistle, the
uncontradicted evidence was that the whistle had been
sounded at the second switch north of Second South, at the
first switch north of Second South, and when the locomotive was about one-half way between First and Second
South Streets (R. 289) . The only independent significance
which a failure to blow a whistle could have on this case
would be by virtue of Section 77-0-14, Utah Code Annotated,
1943. That statute requires, among other things, the blowing of a whistle before each street crossing while passing
through cities and towns. The statute does not even remotely suggest that the whistle be blown just prior to the
entrance of the locomotive into an intersection. The reasonable meaning of the statute is that the whistle be blown
back from the crossing at a place where it can accomplish
some good. It is apparent that a railroad neither discharges
or fails to discharge its duty under that statute by blowing
or failing to blow a whistle just prior to entering an intersection. At the very least, the interrogatory should have
been in the language of the statute. Preferably it should
have inquired whether the whistle was sounded at a place
where it would reasonably give notice of the approaching
locomotive. It was not submitted in that language, and the
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jury's answer is not a finding that any duty imposed by
the statute was violated.
Moreover, there was no evidence to support a finding
that the locomotive was passing through a city or town as
provided in the statute. The uncontradicted evidence was
that the, locomotive was proceeding from the roundhouse to
the Union Depot. As the statute is penal in character,
making the violation thereof a misdemeanor, it must be
strictly construed and cannot be extended by implication.

Gu,aranty Mtg. Co. v. Wilson, 62 Utah 184, 218
Pac. 133;
Millar v. Stuart, 69 Utah 250, 253 Pac. 900.
The evidence was uncontradicted that both plaintiff
and her husband were well aware of the presence of ·danger
when the locomotive was some distance back from the
north edge of the intersection. It is simply inconceivable
that the sounding of the whistle iust prior to the entrance
of the locomotive into the intersection would have prevented
the accident. For that reason, it must be determined as a
matter of law that the failure to blow the whistle iust prior
to the entrance of the locomotive into the intersection was
not a proximate cause of plaintiff's accident and injury.
In view of the foregoing, Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4, the
evidence pertaining to them, are insufficient to sustain a
judgment based thereon.

Interrogatory No. 5: This interrogatory was answered
in favor of defendants, and, therefore, no judgment could be
based thereon.
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Interrogatory No. 7: What is the evidence from which
it could be inferred that the engine crew failed to maintain
a proper lookout? The uncontradicted evidence was that
the engine crew were keeping a lookout in the direction the
locomotive was moving (R. 190, 233, 245). These crew
members saw everything that could be seen under the circumstances. The hostler helper had maintained a position
on the rear end of the locomotive (R. 244). Before the rear
of the locomotive reached the switch nearest Second South,
the hostler helper had no view of automobiles approaching
from the east (R. 243-5). The moment his vision cleared
the building on the northeast corner of the intersection,
the hostler helper saw the automobile in which plaintiff
was riding. He realized that the automobile could not stop
before reaching the tracks, and he immediately jumped off
and gave the engineer an emergency stop signal (R. 233).
The engineer responded immediately to the emergency
signal (R. 235). There is not a single fragment of evidence
in the record from which the jury could find that these
crew members failed to maintain a lookout. It is difficult
to understand how plaintiff could properly contend, or
how a jury could properly find that the view of the crew
members to the east was not obstructed by the building on
the northeast corner of the intersection, making said crew
members negligent, but that the. view of the driver of the
automobile and the plaintiff was blocked by the presence
of said building exonerating plaintiff and the driver from
negligence in that respect. The physical facts themselves,
apart from the testimony of the crew members, conclusively demonstrate that the crew maintained that lookout which
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was possible under the circumstances. They saw the automobile in which plaintiff was riding as soon as it was
possible to do so.

Interrogatory No. 11: This is the interrogatory which
the court evidently believes best sustains the judgment.
Apart from the conflicting evidence relating to this interrogatory, the following considerations are important. What
is the law upon which plaintiff relies to impose a duty
upon defendants to maintain a flagman who shall signal
motorists? What are the limitations of that duty? There is
no statute in this jurisdiction imposing a duty upon a railroad to maintain a flagman at a crossing. Furthermore,
this court has held that it is not negligence for a railroad
to fail to keep a flagman at a public crossing.
Christensen v. 0. S. L. R. R. Co., 80 Pac. 746.
That decision is in accord with the great weight of
authority. See the collection of cases cited for this proposition in the annotation in 60 A. L. R. at 1196. Not owing
plaintiff any duty to maintain a flagman at said crossing,
it would not be negligence for the flagman to fail to station himself in the intersection and wave plaintiff's husband down. The court seems influenced by the testimony
that the watchman was talking on the telephone a short
time prior to the accident. The transcript reveals, however, that the said telephone conversation was in the performance of the watchman's duties. It was a call to the
yardmaster for the purpose of determining the movement
of trains. The evidence demonstrates the watchman's duties
consisted of more than simply flagging the crossing. It
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was his duty to aid in the lining of switches and the signaling of trains and equipment entering the depot. Certainly,
these duties could be performed without subjecting the
railroad to liability for failure to have said watchman stationed in the intersection at all times. As argued by appellants in their brief, and as stated by this court in the
Christensen case cited above, the question to be submitted
to the jury, if any, was whether the defendants had given
reasonable warning of the approach of the locomotive;
negligence could not be predicated solely upon failure to
have a flagman in the intersection or failure to give special
warning of some other type. Failure to have a flagman at
the crossing was only one possible factor to be considered
in determining whether the railroad was negligent in failing to give reasonable warning of the approach of the locomotive. It could not be the basis of negligence in and of
itself.
Interrogatory No. 11 is insufficient to sustain a judgment for other reasons. A reading of said interrogatory
clearly demonstrates that it is duplicitous and ambiguous.
The said interrogatory contains two distinct propositions
stated in the disjunctive or alternative: "Do you find that
the watchman or flagman negligently failed to be stationed
in the intersection or that he negligently failed to signal
the plaintiff or the driver?" The answer to this interrogator was "yes," but what meaning does that answer have?
It means simply that eight jurors agreed that the watchman
either failed to do one thing or do another. It is not a
finding by six of the jurors or more that the watchman
failed to station himself in the intersection and it is not
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a finding by six of the jurors or more that the watchman
failed to signal the plaintiff or the driver. Four jurors
might have been of .the opinion that the watchman failed to
be stationed in the intersection; four might have been of
the opinion that the watchman failed to signal; or three
might have agreed to one proposition and five to the other
proposition. No one can say, however, whether six of the
jurors agreed upon any one of the alternative propositions.
The judgment should not be permitted to stand on the
basis of such an interrogatory.
The general rule is that each special interrogatory
must call for a finding on a single question of fact; an interrogatory combining two or more issues in one question
in the disjunctive or alternative is patently bad.

Gunther v. Ulbrich, 52 N. W. 88;
Martin v. Elbert, 13 N. W. 2d 907;
Butter v; Herring, 34 S. W. 2d 307;
McFadden v. Hebert, 15 S. W. 2d 213;
Friedman v. New York R. Co., 71 Atl. 901;
Illinois Steel Co. v. Mann, 64 N. E. 484;
Jones v. Shelby County, 100 N. W. 520;
Webb v. Boulanger, 229 Pac. 754.
The foregoing principle is so well settled and the
reasons for it so apparent that it would seem to require no
further explanation. Although argued by appellants at
page 41 of their brief, the court makes no mention of the
problem. It is appellants' belief that upon further reflection it will be apparent to the court that the interrogatory
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t:

was improper, and that the answer to it has no effect whatso ever. Certainly, the court should not permit or condone
the practice of submitting this type of interrogatory to a
jury.
The interrogatories which have been discussed above
are the only ones relating to the issues of defendants' negligence. The judgment must be sustained, if at all, on the
basis of said interrogatories. As argued above, there is not
one of those interrogatories upon which a judgment in this
case could be sustained.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD
THAT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
PLAINTIFF'S ACCIDENT AND INJURIES
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRIVER.
In its disposition of the above stated contention, the
court states that the driver's negligence was an issue for
the jury; that the jury's conclusion cannot be overruled.

..'··;

Appellants submit that the evidence and law requires
a finding that the driver was negligent and his negligence
the sole proximate cause. The transcript will show that
the driver apparently assumed that because he saw and
heard no warning of the approach of a locomotive or train
that he could safely proceed into the intersection without
stopping. That is exactly what the driver intended to
and did do despite the fact that he admittedly could not see
to the north of the intersection because of the building
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on the northeast corner thereof. The driver could certainly
not reasonably indulge in such an assumption. He was approaching what he knew to be an intersection; he knew
that he could not see traffic, if any, approaching the intersection from the north. Fourth West Street was and is a
street travelled by conveyances of all types-trains, automobiles and trucks, the driver was confronted with the
likelihood of any one of such conveyances moving into the
intersection from the north. The result of his conduct would
likely have been no different had the south bound conveyance been an automobile instead of the locomotive. The
exercise of reasonable care reasonably required that the
driver maintain a speed which would permit him to stop in
time to avoid colliding with traffic moving south through
said intersection. This he did not do. For the driver to
assume that because he saw no signal and heard no signal
of the approach of a locomotive or train, that he could enter
and pass through the intersection without stopping was
without doubt the grossest form of negligence. The statute,
Section 57-7-113 (a) U. C. A. 1943, (41-6-46 (a) U. C. A.
1953), provides:
"In every event speed shall be so controlled as
may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person,
vehicle or other conveyance on or entering the highway * * * "
The driver did precisely what the statute forbids. His
speed, whatever it was, prevented him from avoiding a
collision with other conveyances entering the intersection.
For these reasons it is apparent that the driver was negli-
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gent as a matter of law. The court should not condone such
conduct.
Moreover, the physical facts and common experience
belie the testimony of the plaintiff and the driver as to the
speed of the automobile. The only independent witness on
this question was S. S. Taylor, a civil engineer and an
expert on stopping distances ( R. 297, 298) . It was his
opinion, based on the undisputed physical facts that the
automobile was travelling at a speed of 25 to 30 miles an
hour when it started to slide ( R. 300) . Any experienced
driver will at once conclude that an automobile travelling
at the speed of 15m. p. h. can be stopped, even on a slippery
road, in a distance of 60 feet. These considerations simply
make the testimony of plaintiff and the driver unworthy
of belief by this court.

......
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The court while recognizing the principal stated therein
distinguishes the several cases cited by appellants in support of this contention on the grounds that they are not
cases involving failure to have a watchman. Appellants
respectfully submit that the principal stated in those cases
applies irrespective of whether the claimed negligence is
failure to give notice by means of a whistle or failure to
give notice by means of a watchman. Those cases assume
negligence on the part of the railroad in failure to give
notice of the approach of a train. Moreover, in at least one
of those cases the plaintiff alleged and attempted to prove
that the railroad was negligent in not maintaining a watchman at the crossing.
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See:

v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry Co., 233
Wis. 291, 289 N. W. 623.

Umlauft

The important consideration is that in the cases cited
by appellants, as in this case, there was simply no proof
that an earlier warning of some kind by the Railroad would
have prevented prevented the accident; in those cases as
in this, that question was entirely speculative and conjectural. The court states at Page 4 o{ its opinion that there
is no suggestion in the ·evidence that had the watchman
signaled the traffic the driver would not have stopped
sooner. This statement would seem to suggest that defendant, rather than plaintiff, has the burden of proof. It was
incumbent upon plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that an earlier warning would have prevented
the accident, not for defendant to disprove that. A finding
in favor of plaintiff on that question must be based on
competent evidence, not on conjecture as to what a driver
would or might do. The undisputed fact is that the driver
knew from the time he entered Second South, a block away,
that he would be approaching the intersection and the railroad crossing. He knew the exact location of the tracks and
he knew that engines and trains passed over the crossing
at all hours of the day and night. He had notice of the
danger at that time and did not protect his safety or that
of plaintiff; at that time and for several hundred feet, the
driver could have acted to prevent the accident. Under
those circumstances his negligence was the sole cause of the
accident and plaintiff's injuries as a matter of law.
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POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINTS V AND VI AS ARGUED IN
APPELLANTS' BRIEF AND IN FAILING TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT THEREON.

......... ~.

Appellants points V and VI, argued in their brief,
were not mentioned by the court in its summary of appellants' contentions and were not discussed in the opinion.
Appellants still believe that those contentions are material
and important as demonstrated by the cited cases and must
be reckoned with in order to sustain the judgment.

~:..:.:.:
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Point V in appellants' brief related to the abstract
definition of the term "proximate cause" given by the trial
court to the jury. The issue of proximate cause was of
vital importance to defendants in this case. It was important that the jury be given an instruction on proximate
cause applied to the evidence which was clear and unambiguous. It is appellants' position that instruction No. 2
given by the trial court to the jury could only result in
confusing the jury on this vital issue. It seems doubtful
to appellants whether the said instruction could be understood by a person legally trained let alone a layman. The
said instruction contains technical legal language which
could not be fully understood by the average juror. By way
of illustration, what does the word "efficient" mean to a
layman? Is there anything in the instruction explaining
the meaning of that word? What does the word intervening
mean to a layman? Is there anything in the instruction or
elsewhere defining that word? It seems highly significant
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to appellants that even the modern legal treatises on this
subject, written for the benefit of legally trained persons,
define causation in terms more easily understood than the
terms employed in instruction No. 2. In the American Law
Institute, Restatement Of The Law of Torts, Volume 2,
Section 431 legal cause is defined as: The actor's negligent
conduct is a cause of harm to the other if (a) his conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm and (b)
there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability
because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted
in the harm. The use of the term "substantial factor" has
a definite and unambiguous meaning to both a lawyer and
a layman. The language contained in instruction No. 2
has no meaning whatsoever; said language could only
confuse a jury. Although the trial court apparently believed that the jury would readily understand the meaning
of the term "intervening" the restatement of the law of
torts written for the benefit of legally trained persons, goes
to some length to define the meaning of that term. In section 441 of the said restatement intervening force is defined
as "(1) an intervening force is one that actively operates
in producing harm to another after the actor's negligent act
or omission has been committed." The said section further
discusses the distinction between dependent and independent intervening forces. It would seem apparent the jury
could not reasonably be expected to understand the meaning of instruction No. 2 or the language contained therein.
As argued by appellants in their brief, the situation was
not aided by any instruction applying the principle to the
facts of the case. The instruction simply stated an abstract
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proposition of law in an ambiguous and misleading manner.
Inasmuch as the question of proximate cause was a vital
one to appellants' defense, the giving of said instruction
clearly prejudiced appellants. Appellants submit therefore,
that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed
on that ground.
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Appellants argued in Point VI of their brief that
Special Interrogatories Nos. 13 and 14 should not have
been submitted to the jury because said interrogatories pertained to issues which should have been determined as a
matter of law. Those interrogatories related to the negligence of the driver of the automobile. The argument made
in this brief under point 4 will demonstrate that the negligence of the driver should have been determined as a
matter of law.
Appellants also contended in Point VI of their brief
that special interrogatories Nos. 7 and 8 should not have
been submitted to the jury. Said interrogatories related to
whether the operators of the locomotive failed to keep a
lookout for automobiles crossing the intersection. As we
have already demonstrated in this brief, there is no evidence from which a jury could find that the said operators
failed to keep a lookout for automobiles crossing the intersection. No jury question was presented upon that claim of
negligence.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully submit that
the Court should grant appellants' petition for rehearing.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &

MCCARTHY

Grant H. Bagley,
Leonard· J. Lewis,
Attorneys for Petitioners.
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